

YELTSIN'S INFLUENCE ON THE FAILURES OF "RUSSIA'S CHOICE PARTY" AND "OUR HOME IS RUSSIA PARTY"

Mehmet Zeki GUNAY^[*]

ABSTRACT

This article aims to discuss the electoral failures of the first two successive 'parties of power' in post-Soviet Russia, namely "Russia's Choice" and "Our Home Is Russia," under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Particularly the article focuses on Boris Yeltsin's influence on the failures of these political parties. The main argument of this article is, without disregarding other factors, that the major reason for the failure of Russia's Choice was Yeltsin's nonparticipation in the party as a result of his attitude against political parties and Our Home Is Russia's failure was mainly related to the identification of the party with the unpopular government and the president, Boris Yeltsin.

Key words: Russian Federation, political parties, Boris Yeltsin, Russia's Choice Party, Our Home Is Russia Party.

ÖZET

Bu makale Sovyet sonrası Rusya'da Boris Yeltsin'in başkanlığı dönemindeki ilk iki 'iktidar partisi' olan Rusya'nın Seçimi Partisi ve Bizim Evimiz Rusya Partisi'nin seçimlerdeki başarısızlıklarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makale özellikle Boris Yeltsin'in bu başarısızlıklardaki etkisine odaklanmaktadır. Makalenin temel argümanı, diğer etkenleri gözardı etmeksizin, Rusya'nın Seçimi Partisi'nin başarısızlığındaki temel etkenin Yeltsin'in siyasi partilere karşı tutumu nedeniyle partiye katılmaması ve Bizim Evimiz Rusya Partisi'nin başarısızlığındaki temel sebebin ise partinin popüler olmayan hükümet ve Başkan Boris Yeltsin ile özdeşleşmesi olduğu şeklindedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Rusya Federasyonu, siyasi partiler, Boris Yeltsin, Rusya'nın Seçimi Partisi, Bizim Evimiz Rusya Partisi.

*1

«

Beşkent Üniversitesi B.A. degree in International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, TURKEY; M.A. degree in Eurasian Studies at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY; Ph.D student in International Relations at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY. mzekigunay@yahoo.com

INTRODUCTION

The route that the Russian leaders followed for Russia's transition to market and democracy resulted in a society in which political capital was highly concentrated in a few people. Consequently, only a small number of individuals with strong connections to power structures in Russia had a real chance to launch Russia's first political parties. However, party leaders were not completely free in designing their own destinies. Presidential administrations in Russia regularly intervened in the party-building projects (Hale, 2006: 26-28). In such an environment the Kremlin, particularly President Yeltsin, had played the leading role in the establishment of the first two successive Russian 'parties of power',¹ which were Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia. Accordingly, the fate and the success of these political parties were highly dependent on President Yeltsin. In this sense while discussing the reasons of the electoral failures of these political parties, special attention should be paid to the influence of Boris Yeltsin.

This article discusses how President Yeltsin was influential in the failures of Russia's Choice Party and Our Home Is Russia Party, and argues, without disregarding other factors, that the major reason for the failure of Russia's Choice was Yeltsin's nonparticipation in the party as a result of his attitude against political parties and Our Home Is Russia's failure was mainly related to the identification of the party with the unpopular government and the president, Boris Yeltsin. Concerning the failure of Russia's Choice, Yeltsin's attitude of avoiding to create a stable 'party of power' forming the basis of a pro-governmental majority in the Duma was significant. (White, 2006: 188). His choice could be understood by examining 'principal-agent problem': Although a political party might help a president rule more authoritatively, the authority that

¹ A 'party of power' is a political organization established with the support of the executive to take part in elections and the legislature process

the party itself would accumulate through this process could become a threat to the president's power, as the party might develop its own interests contradicting those of the president. The party benefits from its reputation of being fully loyal to the president, and it becomes costly to oppose. Another risk is that the party might create leaders of its own, who could become an opponent to the president. As a result of such concerns, state leaders might intentionally weaken their own state institutions to preserve their own power. Therefore, presidents resist the creation of a presidential party that might acquire authority and become independent of the president (Hale, 2006: 207). In this sense, President Yeltsin chose not to participate in the Russia's Choice and tried to prevent the enhancement of the party. This, in turn, led to the electoral failure of the party, despite the high expectations held by the party as the 'party of power'. In the case of Our Home Is Russia, the failure was mainly related to identification of the unpopular government and the president with the party. The popularity of the president is a significant factor affecting the success of the 'parties of power', due to the feature of Russian 'parties of power' mentioned by Edwin Bacon that they gain position from support of the president, rather than the president gaining his position from the support of a party (Bacon, 2004: 42).

While discussing above mentioned points, the article firstly focuses on Russia's Choice Party by examining the establishment, electoral performance, and the electoral failure of the party. Secondly, the article analyses the same points for Our Home Is Russia Party. The final part is the conclusion.

1. RUSSIA'S CHOICE PARTY

1.1. Establishment of Russia's Choice

When Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies on September 21, 1993, the legislature responded by impeaching Yeltsin and electing Aleksandr Rutskoi as acting president. Following this, the army seized the parliament on October 4, 1993. Rutskoi and some other opposition leaders to Yeltsin were arrested. Between these events, on October 1, Yeltsin issued a decree that defined the rules for electing a new parliament² (Golosoov, 2004: 28). However, for the executive, in particular for President Yeltsin, the lack of a political party, a 'party of power', that could represent the executive in the elections was a serious problem.

In the period between 1992 and 1993, there were many attempts to create such a political party. One of these attempts was a meeting called the Forum of Democratic Forces. There were two kinds of participants in the meeting. The first group of participants was some of the national leaders of Democratic Russia, who were totally supporting the government. The second group was the government itself, represented by some senior officials such as Egor Gaidar, who was the acting prime minister and the main planner of the reform program. The creation of a political party that could represent the executive was decided in June 1993. Accordingly, in October 1993 the founding congress of Russia's Choice took place (Golosoov, 2004: 26-29).

² The new parliament, Federal Assembly, was to consist of two chambers. The 450 members of the lower chamber, the State Duma, were to be elected by a mixed electoral system. In this system, while half of the members were to be elected by proportional representation (PR) in a single, nationwide district, the other half was to be elected by plurality in single-member districts (SMD). The proportional representation threshold was set at 5 percent.

1.2. Russia's Choice in 1993 and 1995 Duma Elections

Russia's Choice had important 'political capital', with the participation of democratic activists, government leaders, local heads of administration, and other officials. Russia's Choice was the creation of President Yeltsin's advisors. The party included famous politicians: Egor Gaidar, formal leader of the party and former acting Prime Minister, Anatoly Chubais, the 'privatization tsar', and Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister. These leaders in the eyes of the Russian public represented the ideas of "opposition to the communist regime" and supported "western-style free-market economics and the radical 'shock' method of getting there." (Hale, 2006: 54)

Main component of Russia's Choice was the government itself, and accordingly was perceived as the 'party of power' (Golosov, 2004: 29). The party included

...the president's chief of staff, the president's former state secretary, five deputy prime ministers, the foreign minister, plus the ministers of information, science, culture, and the environment (McFaul, 1998: 119).

The common ideological categorization for political parties using the left-right scale can not be easily applied to the 'parties of power' because their policy choices in elections are shaped not by ideological considerations but by their close ties to the executive. Therefore, the fact that higher government officials were members of Russia's Choice and it utilized its connection with the

executive for electoral aims was more important than the party's support for free-market liberalism (Golosov, 2004: 31).

Russia's Choice focused on its 'administrative capital' rather than on 'ideational capital' of its leadership. In this respect, Russia's Choice, being the 'party of power,' had some advantages. President Yeltsin, as the 'boss' of the party, planned the first Duma elections for less than three months after he had illegally called new elections and suppressed the opposition in the Congress. This sudden election gave no time to the opponents of Russia's Choice to do preparation. Moreover, main opponents of Yeltsin, like former Vice President Rutskoi's party, were banned from the election (Hale, 2006: 54).

Russia's Choice had the advantage of employing regional leaders, who were seeking benefit from the new presidential regime. Major banks gave important support to Russia's Choice. The party enjoyed disproportional coverage on television compared to its rivals, since at the time all of Russia's major television networks were state-owned (Hale, 2006: 54-55).

Rulers of Russia's Choice were sure that the party would be the winner of the 1993 election. They were sure because Russia's Choice was the 'party of power'. As the 'party of power', they thought that they would get the support that Yeltsin got in the April referendum. They assumed that the party would get the support of the voters who were in favor of continuing economic reforms (McFaul, 1998: 119-120). However, the actual result of the 1993 Duma election was certainly a surprise for Russia's Choice. All of the over-confident and optimistic predictions were proved to be wrong.

The results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections were disappointing for Russia's Choice, as the party got only 14.5 percent of the votes. This score was far below 21.4 percent of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's winner Liberal

Democratic Party of Russia, and was not significantly higher than 11.6 percent of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (www.russiavotes.com, 2008). The performance of Russia's Choice was surprising as just eight months before the 1993 parliamentary elections Yeltsin had managed to get the approval of the majority for his presidency and his economic reform plan in the 1993 referendum (McFaul, 1998: 115).

After the 1993 Duma elections, Russia's Choice, later renamed as Democratic Party of Russia, has continued to weaken. Finally, the party lost its status as the 'party of power' to the new project, Our Home Is Russia led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Egor Gaidar remained as the party leader, but other important figures left the party to establish different political parties that contested in the 1995 Duma elections (Hale, 2006: 56). Forty-three political parties were in the ballot in 1995, including eight blocs that were direct successor of Russia's Choice, and twenty electoral blocs whose leaders were once in Democratic Russia (McFaul, 1998: 135). The rise of the contestants and especially the emergence of the new 'party of power' significantly affected Democratic Party of Russia's performance in the 1995 election. The party received only 3.9 percent of the vote and nine district seats. This was a significant defeat in comparison with the results in the 1993 election.

1.3. Electoral Failure of Russia's Choice

The factors resulting in the electoral failure of Russia's Choice in the December 1993 parliamentary election can be found in the party's strategic decision mistakes made during the election period regarding the composition, organization, and leadership of Russia's Choice, and its conduct of the election campaign. The main factor, however, leading to the failure of the party was Yeltsin's nonparticipation in the party. Yeltsin wanted to be above party politics

and was suspicious of political parties, as mentioned by the 'principal-agent problem'.

Yeltsin's nonparticipation in Russia's Choice was influential in the failure of Russia's Choice in the December 1993 election, as the electoral strategy of Russia's Choice mainly relied on its 'administrative capital'. This strategy was defected as President Yeltsin refused to actually join the party and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was more interested in the Party of Russian Unity and Accord than in Russia's Choice (Hale, 2006: 55). President Yeltsin preferred to stay outside of 'the fight of party politics'. Indeed, it was hard for him to support one electoral bloc, as his cabinet members had joined four different blocs. He believed that the 'pro-reform' movements would win the majority of the seats after the election, and so wanted to play the role of a "power broker and mediator between them." (McFaul, 1998: 127)

The executive in Russia, due to the great powers that 'superpresidency' provided it, for a long time did not need political parties to maintain its position in the Russian political system. In such a situation, the possible dangers rather than advantages of creating a true presidential party were taken into consideration. Accordingly, political parties, initially created with the encouragement of Yeltsin, were later ignored. The case of Russia's Choice was the beginning in this trend. In 1993 parliamentary election, most of Yeltsin's government was on the list of Russia's Choice, but he refused to join the party. Following the bad performance of the party, it soon became evident that President Yeltsin was planning to create another 'presidential party'. Indeed, after the election, as supposed by the 'principal-agent problem', in 1994 and 1995 Russia's Choice opposed Yeltsin's decision to send the army to Chechnya, which was one of the most significant issues of the time. Egor Gaidar, as the party leader and acting prime minister, managed to gain power of his own. Russia's Choice, created to be loyal to Yeltsin, turned out to be working against him (Hale, 2006: 208-209).

Confirming the premises of 'principal-agent problem', President Yeltsin was suspicious of political parties in Russia. Although State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, who was Yeltsin's closest adviser, repeatedly advised Yeltsin to create a presidential party he always rejected doing so. Concerning this point, Burbulis states, "Yeltsin feared a party would limit him, that it would commit him to a policy position and limit his freedom of action." (Hough, 1998: 52) Another advisor of Yeltsin, again related to the 'principal-agent problem', warned that Egor Gaidar and some others in Russia's Choice were in political party building efforts to become independent of Yeltsin and they would not be loyal to Yeltsin after the creation of a powerful political party. Therefore, Yeltsin tried to delay the creation of such a political party, thinking that the establishment of it would not be in his interests (Hale, 2006: 209).

Non-participation of Yeltsin in the party created important problems for Russia's Choice. It became difficult for the bloc to offer 'polarized' options to the electorate in the campaign. That is, if the voters saw President Yeltsin and Russia's Choice identical, the campaign would have been more successful, as there would be two real choices—for or against the president. Polls in October 1993 showed that 28.1 percent of the voters would make their decision depending on the leader of the blocs, whereas only 6.8 percent depending on party programs and 3.6 percent on campaign promises (McFaul, 1998: 127).

Yeltsin's non-participation in the party created problems concerning the effectiveness of the leadership of Russia's Choice, which were highly influential in party's performance. In 1993, Egor Gaidar was only first deputy prime minister. He was seen as a 'man of ideas', not as a 'powerful administrator' (Hale, 2006: 55). Gaidar was new in Russian party politics and had no

experience with electoral campaigning. In addition, he lacked many of Yeltsin's leadership features. Moreover, with the absence of Yeltsin, Russia's Choice could not get the votes of President Yeltsin's some electorate (McFaul, 1998: 127-128).

2. OUR HOME IS RUSSIA PARTY

2.1. Establishment of Our Home Is Russia

When Russia's Choice failed to win a majority in the first Duma after the 1993 parliamentary elections, President Yeltsin and the Kremlin decided to create a new 'party of power' for the 1995 Duma elections. President Yeltsin lost his confidence in Russia's Choice not only when it failed to meet his electoral expectations, but also when the party opposed his decision to launch the first Chechen war in late 1994 and early 1995. Following the decision of creating a new 'party of power', President Yeltsin, on April 25, 1995, announced that the party would be 'right-of-center' and would support the government (Hale, 2006: 71). Our Home Is Russia, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, was established in May 1995. Party's main function was supporting the Chernomyrdin government in the 1995 Duma elections and then setting the basis for Yeltsin's reelection campaign in the coming presidential elections of 1996. As Stephen White states, Our Home Is Russia was a 'party of power': "a coalition of the postcommunist political and economic *nomenklatura*, with differing views but a common interest in maintaining their privileged position." (White, 2000: 44) Our Home Is Russia included representatives of the government, important figures of the gas and petroleum industries, and some of the regional elites (Knox, Lentini, Williams, 2006: 6). However, the party represented two constituencies above all: first, the energy complex with which Chernomyrdin was connected, and second, the metallurgical complex with

which the first vice-premier Oleg Soskovets was connected (White, Wyman, Oates, 1997: 771).

Our Home Is Russia quickly managed to get attention of the Russian political environment, mainly due to the 'common interest' mentioned by Stephen White. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was at the center of this attention due to his career at Gazprom. Indeed, some called Our Home Is Russia (*Nash dom - Rossiya*) as '*Nash dom - Gazprom*' (White, 2000: 44).

The Kremlin began to create the new 'party of power' around Chernomyrdin, firstly by changing nearly all of the cabinet. Exceptions to this change included Russia's Choice loyalists Andrei Kozyrev, Anatoly Chubais, and Agrarians Aleksandr Zaveriukha (deputy prime minister) and Aleksandr Nazarchuk (minister of agriculture). This cabinet change with the leadership of Chernomyrdin helped to get the support of the powerful regional elites. Even though some governors refused to join the party formally, they encouraged the building of party branches in their regions. In fact, Vladimir Putin those days was the regional coordinator of Our Home Is Russia in St. Petersburg as second-in-command of Mayor Sobchak (Hale, 2006: 72).

2.2. Our Home Is Russia in 1995 and 1999 Duma Elections

Our Home Is Russia played a 'pro-governmental', or 'party of power' role, like Russia's Choice did in 1993. The party was accepted as the new 'party of power', as many cabinet members, important figures in the government, and high-ranking regional officials joined the party. Our Home Is Russia managed to combine "state administration with private capital," like in the case of Russia's Choice in 1993 (Golosov, 2004: 35). However, the 'party of power' in 1995 was a 'centrist' and not a 'reformist' one like Russia's Choice. In April

1995, Chernomyrdin announced that he would lead a 'center-right' political party. This shift was directly related to the change in the policy of the Yeltsin government, as a response to the harsh economic decline following the 'shock therapy' policies carried out from 1992 to 1995 (Marsh, 2002: 78-79).

Our Home Is Russia stated its position as "reasonable centrism grounded in common sense," which was to be followed by a program claiming "stability and development, democracy and patriotism, confidence and order." (Belin & Orttung, 1997: 34) These promises were formulated also in party's 1995 election campaign slogan - 'On a firm foundation of responsibility and experience' (White et al., 1997: 771).

During the 1995 election campaign, as well as having the support of big businesses, Our Home Is Russia had the advantage of having access to the government apparatus and to the mass media. The party enjoyed significant freedom on campaign expenses. One remarkable example concerning advertisement expenses was the invitation of celebrities, like the German supermodel Claudia Schiffer, to the party's public events (White et al., 1997: 771). In the 1995 parliamentary election, Our Home Is Russia received 10.1 percent of the party list vote and won 10 district seats (Sakwa, 2008: 173), whereas the Communist Party of the Russian Federation got 22.3 percent, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 11.2 percent and Yabloko 6.9 percent of the vote (Golosov, 1998: 539). The results were once again disappointing, after the performance of Russia's Choice in 1993, for the ones seeking the first place for the 'party of power' (www.russiavotes.com, 2008).

Finally, in the 1999 Duma elections, Our Home Is Russia got just 1.2 percent of the party list vote and 2.6 percent of the single member district votes. The

results confirmed that the Kremlin had already abandoned Our Home Is Russia as the 'party of power'.

2.3. Electoral Failure of Our Home Is Russia

The factors behind the electoral failure of Our Home Is Russia in the December 1995 parliamentary election were related mainly to the disadvantages, rather than advantages, of being the 'party of power'. Neil Robinson explains the failure of Our Home Is Russia in 1995 election by referring to a weakness that is a natural feature of the political parties organized by governments:

...they were 'weak organizations' with shallow social roots because they relied on the resources of government to provide them with the means to compete electorally and did not build up mass organizations or mobilize voters through strong organizational structures (Robinson, 1998: 173).

Robert Moser points to the costs of being a 'party of power'. The 'party of power', with its important advantage over economic and political resources had the possibilities to use an effective media campaign against its rivals. In addition, party lists of the 'party of power' were full of the best-known politicians. However, these advantages provided by the state power turned out to be a problem for the party (Moser, 2001: 124). President Yeltsin tried to exploit the public image of Chernomyrdin that he was not considered being in Yeltsin's 'family'. He thought that Chernomyrdin would not be affected by the negative aspects of his administration and could have important popular support.

However, Yeltsin's plan did not become successful (Knox et al., 2006: 6). The identification of the party with the social and economic problems of the country in the transition from communism shadowed the advantages of the resources that the party had enjoyed. This resulted in a certain degree of public opposition (Moser, 2001: 124). In the public, the party was clearly associated with the government performance, which certainly did not mean any advantage. President Yeltsin's popularity was very low due to the war in Chechnya and the economic conditions in the country. Opposition parties tried to play on this and wanted to relate the problems of the Yeltsin administration to Our Home Is Russia (Hale, 2006: 73). They became successful at their efforts. Our Home Is Russia's election program was seen as the conduct of the government since the 1993 elections. Indeed, following the 1993 elections, the government had not been successful. The poor performance of the government was expressed in voter preferences that only 17% of the party's voters fully and 37% with reservations identified themselves with Our Home Is Russia's program and slogans, whereas 43% of the Communist Party's voters fully and 32% with reservations did so with the Communist Party's program and slogans (White et al., 1997: 787).

Our Home Is Russia, following its successful initial strategy of focusing on its 'administrative assets' as the 'party of power', failed to make any improvement in its 'ideational capital'. Even after the 1995 Duma elections the party continued to avoid creating an 'ideational basis'. This situation made Our Home Is Russia open to externally imposed changes in its administrative assets. However, the real damage for the party came in March 1998, when President Yeltsin dismissed Chernomyrdin as prime minister and appointed Sergei Kirienko to his place (Hale, 2006: 73). Indeed, Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin had a "surprisingly harmonious" relationship since his appointment in December 1992, until economic difficulties increased significantly (Remington, 2004: 60).

Recalling the premises of 'principal-agent problem', as in the case of Russia's Choice, Chernomyrdin's dismissal was largely related to the concerns of President Yeltsin that Chernomyrdin was becoming an option for presidency and a threat for his power and status (Hale, 2006: 209). However, Sergei Kirienko could not stay as prime minister for long. The August 1998 financial and economic crisis resulted in his dismissal and decreased President Yeltsin's popularity significantly (Golosov, 2004: 40). After the dismissal of Chernomyrdin, the 'party of power' lost much of its power. Then governors of the party, who were kept together with their aim to have access to Chernomyrdin, started seeking new alliances. Party's new leader, Vladimir Ryzhkov, tried to build an ideational basis, mainly a conservative one, for the party in 1998 and 1999. However, this did not work out, and Our Home Is Russia received only 1.2 percent of the party-list vote and seven district seats in the 1999 election (Hale, 2006: 73; Hanson, 2003: 177).

CONCLUSION

The main factor leading to the electoral failure of Russia's Choice was Yeltsin's nonparticipation in the movement. Yeltsin wanted to be above party politics and was suspicious of political parties, as mentioned by the 'principal-agent problem'. The executive in Russia, thanks to 'superpresidency', for a long time did not need political parties to maintain its position in the political spectrum. Accordingly, the possible dangers rather than advantages of creating a true presidential party were taken into consideration by Yeltsin. In such an environment, Russia's Choice as the 'party of power' lacked the support of the 'power' and this affected its electoral performance significantly.

The factors behind the electoral failure of Our Home Is Russia in parliamentary elections were mainly related to the disadvantages, rather than the advantages, of

being the 'party of power'. As Neil Robinson stated, the 'parties of power' were weak organizations without strong social roots or mass organizations to mobilize voters because they relied on government resources to compete electorally (Robinson, 1998: 173). The dependence of Our Home Is Russia on government resources and its image as the 'party of power' led to the identification of the party with the unpopular government and the president. Social and economic problems of the country associated with the party meant a major disadvantage for the party. President Yeltsin's popularity was very low and this had a devastating effect on the electoral performance of Our Home Is Russia.

REFERENCES

Bacon, Edwin. "Russia's Law on Political Parties: Democracy by Decree?" In *Russian Politics under Putin*, edited by Cameron Ross. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, 39-52.

Belin, Laura, and Robert Orttung. *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995: The Battle for the Duma*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.

Golosov, Grigory. *Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

Golosov, Grigory. "Who Survives? Party Origins, Organizational Development, and Electoral Performance in Post-communist Russia." *Political Studies*, XLVI, 1998, 511-543.

Hale, Henry. *Why Not Parties in Russia?: Democracy, Federalism, and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Hanson, Stephen. "Instrumental Democracy: The End of Ideology and the Decline of Russian Political Parties." In *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, edited by Vicki Hesli and William Reisinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 163-185.

Hough, Jerry F. "Institutional Rules and Party Formation." In *Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993*, edited by Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998, 37-73.

Knox, Zoe, Lentini, P. and Williams, B. "Parties of Power and Russian Politics: A Victory of the State over Civil Society?" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 53, No. 1, January-February 2006, 3-14.

Marsh, Christopher. *Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections and Democratization*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002.

McFaul, Michael. "Russia's Choice: The Perils of Revolutionary Democracy." In *Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993*, edited by Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998, 115-139. Moser, Robert. *Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. Remington, Thomas F. *Politics in Russia*, 3rd ed. London: Pearson Longman, 2004. Robinson, Neil. "Classifying Russia's Party System: The Problem of 'Relevance' in a Time of Uncertainty." In *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia*, edited by John Lovenhardt. London: Frank Cass, 1998, 159-177. Sakwa, Richard. *Russian Politics and Society*, 4th ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

White, David. *The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko: Opposition in a Managed Democracy*. Birmingham: Ashgate, 2006.

White, Stephen. *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

White, Stephen, Wyman, Matthew and Oates, Sarah. "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Election." *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1997, 767-798.

[www.russiavotes.comhttp://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_elections_93-03.php](http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_elections_93-03.php)
(Accessed on 14 August 2008)